A brave new army

Saddam Hussein’s regime does not seem so bad to the people of Iraq anymore. Sometimes they even speak of it nostalgically. At what point did the jubilant masses who poured into the streets of Iraq after the fall of Saddam, turn into potential insurgents targeting the very army that gave them independence?


The broken army

“I’m afraid your army is broken” said retired Major General Robert H. Scales, former commander of the Army War College, in the Washington Post on the 30th Mar 2007, “a victim of too many missions for too few soldiers for too long”.

Like General Scales, most military experts and strategists now have a grim view of the war in Iraq. To most the future looks bleak.

Bruce Hoffman, terrorism analyst at the RAND corporation, also said in the New York Times in 2004: “Unfortunately Iraq has become a cause celebre for radical jihadists the way Afghanistan did a decade and a half ago.”

Nevertheless, the US army is optimistic. In their new counterinsurgency manual released in December 2006, they have listed several approaches they adopted in the past that were successful and others which that were not. Surprisingly the list of unsuccessful practices is shorter than the successful ones. Surprising- because the state of chaos that Iraq is in at the moment suggests otherwise.
One of the main writers of the manual is the newly appointed general in Iraq, General Petraeus. Speaking to the BBC when he took over from General George Casey this year he said, "The situation in Iraq is dire. The stakes are high. There are no easy choices. The way ahead will be very hard,"

But then again he added, “Hard is not hopeless.”

Brain vs. Brawn

His positive approach to the war in Iraq is not the only novel aspect of the General. To fight the insurgency plaguing Iraq General Petraeus has armed himself with a team of scholars on military strategy. The Seattle Times referred to his army of Ph.d’s as his “Brain Trust”. In as much as insurgency is war, it is a war of strategies, requiring more brain than brawn.

One of the solutions proposed by Dr Hashim, of General Petraeus’s so-called brain trust, in his book Insurgency and Counter insurgency in Iraq is - divide the country on the basis of ethnic and sectarian lines.

But, David Fitzgerald, a Ph.d student researching American strategies in Iraq and Vietnam, and a soldier in the Irish army, does not see this solution as viable. He states: “Hashim's argument does have some merit, considering much of the violence is fuelled by ethnic strife now, however, his proposition only becomes viable if the West accepts that large-scale ethnic cleansing is likely to occur in the event of any division of Iraq.”

Judging by the precedent set by the division of former Yugoslavia; dividing the country on sectarian grounds may not be a viable solution. In the Balklands this proved to be a costly and ineffective tourniquet.

Although much of the violence does have religious and ethnic grounds, the US government has played a large part in exacerbating the situation. After the fall of Saddam’s regime much of Saddam’s army was left jobless and resentful. Armed with military knowledge these men have the tools and the motives, not necessarily religious ones, to support the insurgents.

A former officer, Major General Said Jiburi, from the Mosul army, which did not put up much resistance against the Americans, told the Washington post in November 2003:” We didn’t do anything wrong. We’ve been left with nothing. Mosul didn’t put up a fight. We expected the Americans to treat us fairly. Now we are out in the streets. There are thousands of us running out of money, and we are unhappy. That’s why there are attacks.”

How could the development of this resentment been avoided? By emphasising the importance of winning the hearts and minds of the people- advises Dr David Kilcullen, another expert in General Petraeus’s brain trust. In his paper on counter- insurgency; 28 simple points to counter insurgency, he writes ‘For your side to win, people do not have to like you, but they must respect you, accept that your actions benefit them, and trust your integrity and ability to deliver on your promises.’

But promises were not kept. The US government and the coalition army did not win over the trust or the respect of the Iraqi people. The atrocities committed at Guantanomo Bay towards their people, pushed them further towards the insurgents cause.

The US government also alienated a very potent and valuable ally- the middle class. In an interview in the Guardian in 2004 a Sunni observer voiced grievances on behalf of the Iraqi people: “It is not acceptable to us as human beings that America is still not able to bring us electricity.”

Fishing in troubled waters

Mao’s analogy simply puts it:” As a fish in the sea, so too is the guerrilla amongst people.” The present circumstances created by the Americans in Iraq, has provided an environment rife with resentment towards them-furthering the insurgents cause. And as Mao says without the environment to harbour the resentment the insurgents would be like fish out of water. Additionally the religious nature of the insurgency adds nobility to the cause.

As Montasser Al-Zayyat writes in his book The road to Al-Qaeda, “When someone believes an idea, especially if this idea is related to a noble and ancient civilisation like Islam, this belief can transcend social class and considerations. Poverty may indeed lead to violence put it is not poverty which leads to Islamic ideology. The followers of Islamic thought included both the rich and the underprivileged, just as the underprivileged turn to Islamic institutions as a source of social solidarity and justice against their plight.”

The US government has adopted successful counter insurgency strategies involving local people. For example, in Malay the British took a section of the population- the Chinese farmers, under their wing. Similarly the US has adopted the Shias .However; this strategy drove the Sunni straight into the insurgency. In David Fitzgerald’s opinion, “Should the Americans increase support of the Shia’s the insurgency would be further aggravated, as was the case in Northern Ireland. The British support of the protestant Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) simply pushed more Catholics into the arms of the IRA.”

Another aspect fostering the chaos in Iraq is the political vacillation behind every move. An example of the divided opinions over the situation is evident in Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Syria recently. The Guardian reported on 4 April 2007 that, ‘Pelosi’s visit angered the Bush administration’. Primarily because the Bush administration has accused Syria of supporting Sunni insurgents.

Despite several recommendations from the Iraq study group that the Bush administration should start up dialogues with Iraq’s neighbours, they have refrained from doing so. The disapproval meted out to Nancy Pelosi for a move in a direction recommended by the Iraq study group seems counter-productive to the American presence in Iraq.

Securing neighbourhood countries is essential to counter-insurgency tactics. The success of which is illustrated by the British in South Africa while trying to curb the spread of the ANC (African National Congress). It gave the insurgents no place to hide. Admittedly most of South Africa’s neighbouring states were colonies. But the fact that the ANC did not have a place to hide in neighbouring countries left them vulnerable.

Does this mean that it is too late in Iraq?

“Perhaps” says David Fitzgerald, “Essentially in a counterinsurgency campaign, the emphasis needs to be on providing security and essential services (theUS Army has been using SWET teams - sewage, water, electricity, trash- to do this) to the population, not on killing insurgents or on forceprotection. The problem with all this is that Petraeus knows this already. However, he may not have the time, troops or resources to accomplish this. The Americans are pretty much doing all these things now in Baghdad but it may be too late.”

The new manual drafted by General Petraeus and his experts last year will indeed prove to be just what Iraq needs- provided the General has the time and the means required at his disposal. Newsweek reported on 22 February 2007, that when the General was asked how long he would need in Iraq, he replied “I can’t give you any dates at this time.”

A matter of time

American public opinion over the war is as conflicted as that of their Government’s. Judging by the opinion polls of the presidential candidates conducted by ABC news on 6 March 2007, Senator McCain, a vociferous supporter of the war, seems to have a wide support base. However, Reuters reported on 11 April 2007, that his support has been dwindling.

If Senator McCain were to succeed President Bush, perhaps then General Petraeus will have the time he needs to make the most of his brain trust and stabilise Iraq. Since his way was deemed by US military experts in the Newsweek as – “the only way to stabilize Iraq”.

Counter-insurgency is a slippery war; one that cannot be won by brute force. This has been established by the US government in Vietnam, and now in Iraq. Whether Gen. Petraeus will have the opportunity to spur his broken army into a brave new one –and give the people of Iraq something to actually celebrate- only time and the American public opinion will tell. (1,582 words)